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the position that the interest invaded is mental and therefore the
plaintiff must suffer mental anguish at the time he is confined.
Disregarding the meaning of the vague term "technical assault,"
it is clear that if X is in a room and Y turns the key in the
door there may be false imprisonment, but there is certainly no
assault without something further. False imprisonment is not
so much an invasion of a mental interest in security as it is
of the right of free locomotion. The instant the key is turned in
the door rather than the moment of discovery is the point of
time when false imprisonment should begin.
The rule supported by the writers puts a premium on subter-
fuge. In other words, one may safely enclose another and
accomplish some end detrimental to him so long as he is clever
enough or lucky enough to hide that fact of imprisonment from
the one confined. X knows that Y will be called at a certain
time by a prospective employer. The employer needs the job
filled quickly. X also wants the job, so he induces Y, who is
always home at this time, to come to his home, where he locks
him in a room, making the excuse that they are likely to be
disturbed. Y's wife calls and X answers the phone and refuses
to let her tell Y about the job; Y does not discover the trick until
he returns home. He has no action for false imprisonment against
X under the rule supported by the text writers.
Such a view. is likely to produce bad social results. If the
common law is so zealous of personal freedom that it raises a
cause of action against a private person who arrests another in
good faith if in fact no felony has been committed, why should it
permit some one else, for no just cause, to confine another and be
free of liability so long as he can keep the fact of restraint from
the one ,onfined?
It is submitted that the rule, in its present form, is undesirable.
Should personal freedom and its social consequences be so lowly
regarded? Should the common law intrust to anyone such oppor-
tunity for interfering with another's right to free locomotion, or,
in fact, encourage it?
SCOTT REED
LIABILITY OF SUBLESSEE AND ASSIGNEE
TO OWNER FOR RENT
In Entroth Shoe Co. v. Johnsoie the plaintiff, owner, leased
a store for a term extending from February 1, 1929, to April 30,
1932. On February 25, 1920, the lessee leased a part of the
prermses to the defendpnt for the remainder of the term. Shortly
before February 1, 1931, the defendant abandoned the premises.
On October 1, 1931, the defendant settled with the lessee and secured
1260 Ky. 309, 85 S. W (2d) 686 (1935).
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a release from all further liability The plaintiff received no relit
after February 1, 1931, and sued the lessee and the defendant to
recover the rent due. The lessee did not defend. In holding 'the
defendant liable for rent from February 1 to October 1, the court
said that the defendant was an assignee, not a sublessee, and as
such he was in privity of estate with the owner and liable only
so long as that privity existed. It was held that this privity was
not destroyed by the defendant's abandonment, but that the
settlement between the defendant and the lessee was a reassign-
ment of the lease, and tis reassignment released the defendant
of any further liability.
This case illustrates the law in regard to the liability of the
transferee of a lease to the owner. The transfer of a lease may
take one of two forms; it may be an assignment or a sublease. The
liability of the transferee depends upon which form the transfer
takes.
At common law, a sublessee or subtenant was said to be neither
in privity of estate nor in privity of contract with the owner. He
was not liable to the owner on the terms of the lease nor could
there be any recovery from him for use and occupation of the land.
In many jurisdictions, including Kentucky a sublessee's liability
has been increased by statute. KRS 383.010 (5) provides that
'Rent may be recovered from the lessee. or his assignee or
undertenant by any of the remedies given in this chapter.
But the assignee or subtenant shall be liable only for rent accrued
after his interest began." It has been held -that this statute
gives the owner a right to a lien on the subtenant's chattels,' but
no cases have been found deciding the question as to whether it
makes the subtenant personally liable to the landlord. The
language of the statute makes such a construction possible. How-
ever, in Missouri it was held that a similar statute gives the owner
no right against the subtenant other than the right to enforce a
statutory lien against his chattels.'
An assignee, on the other hand, is bound by personal obliga-
tion to the owner. He is subject to the same liabilities for rent
as his assignor in regard to obligations arising out of privity of
estate,5 since rent is considered: to be something issuing from
Cox v. Fenwick, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 538 (1817), 1 TIFFANY, LAND-
LORD AND TEN r (1912), sec. 162.
3Bowling v. Garber, 250 Ky. 137, 61 S. W (2d) 1102 (1933)
Sutton v. Perkins, 2 Ky. Law Rep. 233 (1881), Ringo v. Ford, I Ky.
Opin. 561 (1874).
'St. Joseph & St. L. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry Co.
135 Mo; 173, 36 S.W 602 (1896)
5 Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Consolidated Realty Co., 251 Ky
614, 65 S.W (2d) 724 (1933), Meyer Bros. Assignee v. Gaertner,
106 Ky. 481, 50 S. W 852, 45 L. R. A. 510 (1899), Riley v. L. L. & C.
Ry. Co., 6 Ky. Opm. 183 (1872), McCormick v Young, 32 Ky. (2
Dana) 294 (1834); Cox v. Fenwick, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 538 (1817),
1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) sec. 158.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
the land itself, not unlike a profit, rather than a mere contractual
obligation.' As an abandonment does not destroy the privity of
estate, it does not remove the obligation to pay rent. But it is
generally held that a further assignment of the whole interest to a
third party will destroy the privity of estate and hence will relieve
the first assignee of future liability for "rent.
This rule allowing an assignee to terminate his liability at any
time he wishes by reassigning the lease gives the assignee an ad-
vantage. He has all the rights under the lease wich the original
lessee had, but if the lease proves disadvantageous to him he may
relieve himself of further liability by reassigning to a third party.
He may do tis without consent of the owner or of his assignor.
He may assign to an irresponsible person, an insolvent person,
or to one about to leave the country, and it makes no difference
that the assignment is for the express purpose of ridding himself
of liability, or that he pays another to accept the assignment.!
If the assignee of a lease assumes the covenants of the original
lease a different situation exists. Under the contract rule such an
assumption of the contractual obligations will be implied from the
mere acceptance of the assignment.' This -is not true in regard
to the assumption of the covenants of a lease. Such an assumption
must be expressly made in the assignment. Where such an express
assumption is made, a third party beneficiary contract of the pay-
ment type exists. Jurisdictions which recognize contracts for the
benefit of third persons will hold such an assignee liable to the
owner on contract." Because the liability does not depend on
privity of estate a reassignment to a third person will not ternnate
the liability.
The general rule is that a grant of the entire interest remain-
ing in the lessee in the whole or part of the premises constitutes
an assignment rather than a sublease as between the owner and
the transferee of the lease." From this rule it follows that the
court in the present case was right in determining that the
defendant was an assignee. Following the general rule govern-
ing assignments the court rightly held that the defendant was
6 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) see. 876.
'Meyer Bros. Assignee v Gaertner, 106 Ky. 481, 50 S.W 852;
45 L.R.A. 510 (1899) Traube v. McAdams, 71 Ky (8 Bush) 74
(1871), 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) see. 158 (aa)
8Meyer Bros. Assignee v Gaertner, 106 Ky 481, 50 S.W 852,
45 L.R.A. 510 (1899)
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1933) sec. 164; WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS (Student Ed. 1926) sec. 412.
"1 TFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) see. 158 (bb).
"TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (Abridged Ed. 1940) see. 94.
STUDENT Noms 217
personally liable to the plaintiff for rent, and that the defendant's
abandonment did not destroy this liability. Then applying the
rule that a reassignment to a third party terminates the assignor's
liability, the court l3roperly held that a reassignment to the original
lessor would have the same effect, and that from the time of this
reassignment the defendant was no longer liable.
J. J. YEAGER
